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Abstract 
 The mainstream neoconservative perception of the persisting global conflict 
surrounding Iran’s nuclear program generally casts the nation as pursuing nuclear 
weaponry with the nefarious intentions of undermining western security interests 
and using these capabilities against Israel or European nations. Conversely, realist 
and constructivist scholars suggest that Iran’s alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons is 
anything but irrational. Instead, Iran’s foreign policy represents a logical reaction to 
regional insecurities and collective identity formed by Iran’s history of past glory 
and subsequent marginalization, the mutual distrust between the U.S. and Iran 
following the ousting of the Shah, and Iran’s domestic political dynamics all 
contribute to the repeated failure to resolve current crisis. Assuming a realist and 
constructivist analytical framework, it is argued that efforts to coerce Iran into 
altering its foreign policy have failed due to a lack of understanding of the extent to 
which Iranian national identity affects its attitudes towards nuclear development 
and openness to cooperate with western powers. In this sense, mutual animosity 
and confrontational engagement continues to prevent the achievement of any 
meaningful diplomatic progress.  
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Introduction 
Since the invention of the atomic bomb, the modern world has become 
acutely aware of the potentially severe consequences stemming from a nation’s 
acquisition of nuclear capabilities. Used an offensive tool, such weapons allowed the 
United States to end its bloody war against Japan in moments, the sheer power 
demonstrated by the first nuclear offensive dissuading any further aggression. The 
scope of destruction witnessed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki shifted the emphasis on 
nuclear weaponization from a viable wartime option to a strategy of deterrence, 
with the looming threat of mutual destruction enough to ensure the non-
proliferation of disputes beyond convention warfare. While nuclear armament 
dramatically changed the way in which nations approach armed conflict and 
brought about a new era of relative peace between nation-states, the potential for 
nuclear engagement remains perhaps one of the most pressing concerns facing the 
international community. 
The Treat on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) reflects the near-
unanimous agreement that the use and distribution of nuclear weapons should be 
limited and regulated by the international community. The permanent members on 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), The United States, Russia, The United 
Kingdom, France, and China, along with the vast majority of states, are signatories to 
the NPT. Although the nations represented on the UNSC have since ceased 
production of nuclear weapons, they still maintain current stockpiles unwilling to 
forgo the degree of deterrence and relative security such weapons assure. While the 
global anti-nuclear armament consensus prohibits other nations from developing 
their own means of nuclear deterrence, it does not extinguish such aspirations or 
provide them with an alternative means to prevent foreign military incursions of 
their potential destruction. Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea are the only 
known nations to have defied international norms by refusing to adhere to the NPT 
and succeeding in the production of nuclear warheads. 
Yet in the last 30 years, no nuclear program has received such international 
attention and condemnation as that of the Islamic Republic of Iran. As a signatory to 
the NPT since its conception in 1968, Iran contends that its nuclear development is 
strictly civilian-oriented in nature, the pursuit of which is permitted without 
prejudice to all states that have ratified the treaty. Since the Islamic Revolution of 
1979, however, the western world insists that Iran is in pursuit of weaponization, 
and have consistently applied diplomatic and economic pressure with the aim of 
curtailing Iran’s nuclear aspirations. Even though international outcry has existed 
ever since the toppling of the Shah, the west has yet to see any tangible changes in 
Iran’s nuclear policy regardless of the tactics and strategies employed. Iran’s leaders 
and populace have consistently demonstrated support for nuclear development, 
despite the severity of economic sanctions or the regularity of denunciations in 
international forums. Such behavior appears irrational to onlookers that assume 
Iran’s policy should align with its economic and security interests. Accordingly the 
west continues to pursue the same ‘dual track’ policy of engagement, pushing for 
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more stringent sanctions paired with limited diplomatic outreach (Takeyh & 
Maloney 2011). 
As tensions escalate between the west and the Iranian regime, a 
reconceptualization of both the realistic scope and consequences of Iran’s nuclear 
pursuits and the west’s strategy of engagement becomes increasingly imperative in 
order to avoid the instigation of another significant conflict in the Middle East. U.S. 
and Israeli politicians and pundits suggest that a preemptive strike is increasingly 
necessary, assuming an alarmist attitude in declaring that Iran’s nuclear 
development portends dire consequences for regional and global stability. Iranian 
leaders suggest that any foreign incursion on Iranian soil will result in unyielding 
and determined military retaliation, a serious threat given Iran’s sizeable 
conventional military and sway over the global supply of petroleum. 
Neoconservative political actors, through discursive posturing and hawkish 
policies, partially co-opt realist notions of regional hegemony and balance of power 
security concerns to construct of the image of an irrational Iranian regime hell-bent 
on developing nuclear weapons as a means to destroy the ‘Zionist’ state of Israel and 
assert itself as a regional hegemon. They assert that Iran must not be allowed to 
acquire nuclear capabilities, as such a development would surely work against U.S. 
interests in the Middle East and pose an ‘existential’ threat to the state of Israel 
(Freilich, 2012). Through this lens, military action is preferred over diplomatic 
engagement, as the goals of the religious fundamentalists comprising the Iranian 
regime are irreconcilable with western reason. However, inflammatory rhetoric and 
calls for the ousting of the current regime not only decreases the prospects of 
reaching a peaceful solution, but also serves to strengthen Iranian support for a 
nuclear deterrent and increases the likelihood of weaponization.  
Conversely, realist and constructivist scholars suggest that Iran’s pursuit of 
nuclear weapons is anything but irrational. Instead, its foreign policy represents a 
logical reaction to the regional insecurities brought on by an increasing U.S. military 
presence in the Middle East and a slew of unfriendly regional neighbors that 
possesses nuclear arms and have yet to ratify the NPT. While security-seeking 
calculations motivate Iran’s foreign policy and the west’s response, a deeper 
understanding of the ever-changing domestic political climate within Iran and the 
United States reveals a more nuanced understanding of the underlying forces 
behind what is perceived as united foreign policy. The collective identity formed by 
Iran’s history of past glory and subsequent marginalization, the mutual distrust 
between the U.S. and Iran following the ousting of the Shah, and Iran’s domestic 
political dynamics all contribute to the repeated failure to resolve current crisis.  
Thus, efforts to coerce Iran into altering its foreign policy have failed due to a 
lack of understanding of the extent to which Iranian national identity affects its 
attitudes towards nuclear development and openness to cooperate with western 
powers. In this sense, mutual animosity and confrontational engagement continues 
to prevent the achievement of any meaningful diplomatic progress. Furthermore, 
the alarmist conception of a nefarious Iran determined to develop nuclear weapons 
in order to carry out an attack against Israel or to leverage its way into a position of 
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regional dominance fails to acknowledge the sense of logic and reason that have 
dominated both Iranian and American policy thus far. In weighing realist 
conceptualizations of Iranian intentions against the doomsayer cries of 
neoconservative commentators, the fallibility of the mainstream formulation of the 
Iranian crisis becomes remarkably transparent. 
This thesis first surveys the scholarly contributions and commentary 
associated with the neoconservative, realist and constructivist schools of thought, 
creating an analytical framework in which the theories of realism and 
constructivism guide our exploration of the Iranian nuclear issue. We review the 
development of Iran’s nuclear program before delving into the factors that 
contribute to the Iranian national myth, focusing on the nation’s history and the 
genesis of its revolutionary narrative. We then turn to the Iran’s domestic struggles, 
motivations and intentions, unpacking the ways in which these elements interact 
and culminate in the formulation of Iranian policy and the west’s conception of the 
Islamic Republic. Finally, our analysis explores the United States’ reaction to Iran’s 
nuclear aspirations and foreign policy, focusing on the various domestic political 
currents that have shaped the U.S. approach since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. On 
the basis of this analytical framework, potential policies and solutions to Iranian 
nuclear issues are posited, emphasizing the ways in which current and future 




 The mainstream characterization of the Iranian regime, following the 
tumultuous aftermath of the 1979 Islamic revolution, is one driven by unpredictable 
religious zeal and intent on both the destruction of the Israeli state and the 
ascension to a position of regional hegemony. This viewpoint, championed by 
neoconservatives in the United States, Israel, and Europe, contributes to the alarmist 
account of Iran’s nuclear aspirations and fuels the bellicose rhetoric touted by 
pundits and politicians warning of the catastrophic repercussions of a nuclear Iran. 
From this perspective, the main concern is that a nuclear Iran will stop at nothing to 
regain a dominant regional position in order to forward the underlying goals of the 
Islamic Revolution (Davis 2005). Neoconservative scholars refute the efficacy of 
diplomatic efforts, asserting that the religious ideology integrated into the Islamic 
Republic’s political structure dooms negotiations based on rationality and 
pragmatism. They also reject the argument that a strategy of ex post facto 
deterrence could mitigate the negative repercussions of a nuclear Iran given that 
such a program would come at too high a cost in terms military/intelligence 
personnel and financial commitments (Kroenig 2012). Framing Iran as a pariah 
nation that cannot be made to see reason or respond logically to western-centric 
strategies of engagement bolsters the arguments of those who advocate for military 
intervention and increasingly stringent sanctions. 
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 Eric Edelman, Andrew Krepinevich, and Even Montgomery (2011) assert that 
while some suggest that Iran would inherently become more cooperative if it would 
to develop nuclear capabilities, Iran’s tendency to ignore international standards 
and to actively seek increased regional influence predicts that its tenacious and 
intransigent qualities will become more pronounced following its procurement of 
nuclear weapons. They contend that economic pressure and diplomatic engagement 
will continue to fail to produce tangible adjustments in Iran’s nuclear policies, 
instead advocating for increased military encirclement as a concrete demonstration 
of the potential consequences of Iran’s continued intransigence. The fear that Iran’s 
acquisition of nuclear weapons will spur a Middle Eastern arms race underlies 
general anxieties surrounding a potential upset of regional stability and the erosion 
of the security interests of the United States. The prevailing sentiment is that the 
prospect of a nuclear Iran is unacceptable due to the dangers it would pose to the 
regional balance of power, and the potential inability of the United States to 
effectively contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the Middle East.  
 As the nation that feels most threatened by Iran’s rhetorical posturing and 
ideological condemnation, Israel assumes the most belligerent attitude towards the 
prospect of a nuclear Iran. Dima Adamsky (2011) suggests that while three different 
schools of thought are likely to emerge in a scenario in which Iran succeeds in 
weaponization, the conception of Iranian leaders as willing to sacrifice the nation’s 
security interests on the basis of religious ideology leads the majority of Israelis to 
advocate for a full-on military offensive. Given the scars of past historical conflicts 
and persecution, national security is of paramount importance and represents a 
fundamental element of Israeli identity. Because Israeli leaders have sought to 
consolidate public support by exacerbating public fears through the 
characterization of Iran as a belligerent and irrational nation that seeks to instigate 
a second holocaust, the destruction of Iranian capabilities, regardless of the 
potential political and security costs, has emerged as the prevailing sentiment. The 
conviction that Israel cannot rely on the hesitant U.S. to effectively defend its 
superior position in the regional balance of power runs parallel to the 
neoconservative preference for military intervention over diplomatic negotiations. 
Yet, a recent poll conducted by Haaretz, a left-leaning Israeli magazine, found that 
58% of Israelis oppose unilateral military intervention without U.S. support, 
providing evidence that the ‘go-it-alone’ rhetoric of the political leadership is 
seemingly at odds with the prevailing attitudes of the Israeli public (Pfeffer 2012). 
 While Matthew Kronenig (2012) refutes the conception of Iran’s leadership 
as irrational and self-destructive, he comes to the archetypal neoliberal conclusion 
that the U.S. must strike militarily before Iran is able to weaponize its stores of 
uranium in order to avoid the imminent threat to American security interests. He 
shrugs off the critics’ view that an attack would lead to severe retaliation and only 
solidify Iranian resolve to develop an effective means of deterrence, instead placing 
faith in the ability of the United States to anticipate the most damaging 
counterattacks and to minimize the risk of the Iranian response. Kronenig’s notion 
of “strike now or suffer later” embodies the neoconservative assumption that Iran 
not only aspires to achieve nuclear militarization, but also intends to use its 
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newfound power as a means to hamper U.S. operational capabilities in the Middle 
East, further entrench the current regime’s political monopoly, and make possible 
conventional military offensives without the specter of international intervention. 
 Politicians and public figures have come to favor the neoconservative 
conceptualization of the Iranian nuclear crisis. The media seeks the sensationalist 
portrait of a belligerent and irrational Iran as a means to whip the public into a 
frenzy and sustain general interest, consistently reiterating that a nuclear Iran 
necessarily poses a novel and especially dire threat to American or Israeli life. While 
several pundits and publications have demonstrated a commitment to depicting the 
Iranian issue from a plurality of viewpoints, the mainstream media has generally 
framed the conflict in accordance to the abovementioned alarmist formulations and 
sowed bias within the discourse by: ignoring the effect of a potential military clash 
on civilian populations, discussing Iran’s nuclear weapons as if their existence is 
already confirmed, emphasizing Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric despite his waning hold on 
domestic power, and disregarding the motivations behind Iranian policies (Walt 
2012). Political figures elicit existential fears by referencing a nuclear holocaust, 
creating a moral panic in order to garner support for tangentially related policies, 
appealing to a wider swath of the electorate, or distracting from other, less flattering 
political issues (Heir 2002). However, assuming a more factually oriented and less 
ideologically influenced analytical frame reveals a far more nuanced understanding 
of the inherent attributes and potential outcomes associated with Iranian nuclear 
aspirations. 
Realist Views 
 In debating the structural and geopolitical forces which drive Iran’s nuclear 
development policy, the realist school of thought encompasses the majority of 
scholars who step back from the mainstream neoconservative conception of Iran as 
a dangerous existential threat, instead adopting a different theoretical lens that 
focuses primarily on security considerations as the main driver of the Iranian 
nuclear crisis. These authors operate under the assumption that the nation-state 
should be the primary level of analysis, taking precedence over notions of domestic 
political concerns, norms, and ideas (Ferrero 2009). The behavior of a state, given 
this theoretical construct, is derived from state to state interactions in the current 
international system, where the balance of power and the drive for optimal wealth 
and influence shape foreign policy (Walt 2008). The realists’ primary rationale for 
Iran’s controversial nuclear development program and the prolonged international 
conflict resulting from its unyeilding pursuits is based on the assumption that the 
state of Iran, as a rational actor, seeks nuclear armament as a means of deterrence 
against foreign incursions on its independence. While Iran asserts that its nuclear 
aspirations are solely aimed at providing civilian power and lessening its reliance on 
fossil fuels, realists view such a motive as irrational and thus operate under the 
theory that Iran must be pursuing nuclear weapons. Rejecting the neoconservative 
belief that a nuclear Iran represents a significant security threat to the United States, 
realists suggest that the motives behind American foreign policy are mainly to 
prevent Iran from ascending to a position of regional hegemony. 
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 Ray Takeyh (2003) understands Iran’s desire for nuclear development as a 
reaction to perceived encirclement by its enemies. American troops in the Persian 
Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq represent constant threats to Iranian security, while a 
hostile Israel has already carried out preemptive strikes on nuclear hopefuls in the 
region and has a clandestine nuclear program of unknown size. These pressures, 
coupled with the Bush-era rhetoric labeling Iran as part of the ‘axis of evil’, logically 
result in Iran’s pursuit of a means to defend its strategic interests. However, he 
argues that the U.S.’s hard-liner posturing is based on the faulty assumptions that 
Iran would use a nuclear weapon if given the chance to do so. Takeyh challenges the 
generally accepted formulation of Iran as a dangerous and potentially violent state, 
noting that the country has been the victim in the majority of its military conflicts 
and has demonstrated caution with respect to direct confrontation with its enemies. 
For example, Iran refrained from utilizing chemical weapons against the Iraqi state 
during the Iran-Iraq war, even though Iraqi forces used chemical warfare against the 
Iranian populace. In suggesting that Iran’s hostile rhetoric towards the ‘Zionist’ 
Israeli state diverges from actual policy considerations, Takeyh reinforces the realist 
concept of placing the behavior of the state above consideration of its values and 
norms. 
 Bruce Riedel (2010) explains the consequences of Iran’s ascension to the 
nuclear club by utilizing a realist perspective to suggest that nuclear armament 
would not result in catastrophic regional consequences and would have a negligible 
impact on the balance of military power in the Middle East. In drawing from the 
realist formulation of security seeking behaviors in international relations, he notes 
that Iran’s aspirations would be solely for increased deterrence, autonomy, and 
greater regional influence. Contrary to claims that Iran would distribute nuclear 
weapons to Hezbollah or Hamas as a means of waging a proxy war against Israel or 
that its emphasis on Shia Islamist doctrine extoling the values of Muslim conquest 
would increase the likelihood of nuclear proliferation, Riedel points to Iran’s history 
of victimization rather than aggression, Israel’s conventional military dominance, 
and the harsh sanctions choking off the inflow of advanced weaponry as indicating 
that Iran would resist using nuclear force. Additionally, the Syrian insurrection has 
displaced Hamas and resulted in the erosion of Iran’s influence over the 
organization, suggesting that the potentiality of a nuclear proxy offensive seems less 
realistic (Scham 2012). Through this lens, it is argued that Iran’s behavior is simply 
reactionary given that the overall balance of regional power renders any offensive 
action unlikely. Riedel challenges the assertion that a nuclear Iran poses a legitimate 
existential threat to both the Israeli state and regional stability, qualifying Iran’s 
behavior as rational and justified given the environmental context in which Iranian 
foreign policy exists. 
  While Riedel and Takeyh focus mainly on Iranian security concerns, Stephen 
Walt and John Mearsheimer (2007) utilize realist theory in order to challenge the 
commonly accepted justifications behind contemporary U.S. policies and attitudes 
towards Iran. Realists suggest that since the behaviors of states are solely motivated 
by either security or the pursuit of power, given the anarchical state of global affairs, 
the interactions between the United States and Iran should be directly related to and 
 9 
explained by such considerations. Iran’s geographical distance from the U.S. 
combined with America’s vast military superiority precludes the possibility of Iran 
posing a legitimate security threat to the United States. Realistically, the majority of 
Iran’s most aggressive political rhetoric has been aimed at Israel, while their 
geographical proximity makes a nuclear Iran a far greater threat to Israeli security 
concerns. Walt and Mearsheimer controversially assert that the Israeli political 
lobby in the U.S. has prevented the nation from improving diplomatic relations with 
Iran, even though reconciliation would be in both nations’ best interests.  
Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons or increased power and prosperity 
resulting from normalized U.S.-Iranian relations would both challenge Israel’s 
strategic dominance and increase Iran’s regional standing in the eyes of other Gulf 
states. While the authors note that the U.S. does have a vested interest in preventing 
any single Middle Eastern nation from assuming the role of regional hegemon, they 
suggest that better diplomatic ties with Iran would be the premier strategy to 
ensure peace and work towards improving America’s image in the eyes of the 
Iranian public. America’s refusal to take the threat of preemptive war off the table 
also serves to undermine its interests, as an attack on Iran’s nuclear sites would 
result in retaliation or increased support for the development of a nuclear deterrent. 
Additionally, levying increasingly stringent sanctions, the preferred modus operandi 
of the United States, has a tendency to backfire: increasing the price of crude oil and 
curtailing American businesses that profit from trade with Iran (Torbat 2005). By 
framing American interests in terms of realist objectives, Walt and Mearsheimer 
highlight the extent of Israeli influence within U.S. domestic politics and also open 
the door to changes in foreign policy that they postulate would better reflect 
American security interests. 
In exploring the ways in which the pursuit of material gains and security 
considerations drive the behavior of both the U.S. and Iran, realist theory can help 
us conceptualize how states are prone to behave under certain conditions. However, 
realist thought tends discount the role of ideas, values, and norms within and 
between states in dictating how states actually conduct foreign policy. Such scholars 
tend to simplify international relations to the detriment of a more nuanced 
understanding of the role of domestic politics and values in shaping the terms of 
engagement and predicting cooperation or conflict. The internal political structure 
of a state and the positions taken by of its ruling regime strongly influence a nation’s 
foreign policy, and must be assessed in order to gain a holistic understanding of 
both U.S.-Iran relations and the Iranian nuclear crisis.  
Constructivist Views 
 To delve more deeply into the role of societal norms, values, and beliefs in 
dictating a nation’s foreign policy, other scholars analyze the conflict between the 
United States and Iran from a constructivist standpoint. Constructivist theory holds 
that the ideas and values of political actors derived through mutually constitutive 
discourse with the rest of the world dictate a nation’s foreign policy beyond the 
basic considerations of power-seeking and security motivations. It is the way in 
which an issue or foreign entity is perceived that explains both domestic attitudes 
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and the interaction between nation-states (Ferrero 2009). Contrary to the 
underlying tenets of realist thought, constructivism questions the validity of using 
rationality to explain the behavior of states. It asserts that rationality is relative to 
each actor or society’s social goals and norms, and that “value-rational” behavior 
differs between and within states in the international system. Thus the notion of an 
Iranian nuclear ‘crisis’ is fallacious, as an objective reality cannot exist given the 
subjective nature of each individual actor’s perception. Instead, the ideologies and 
identities within a state contribute to its ideational structure, which in turn affect its 
interactions with other states.  
Seyed Shafaee (2010) refutes the popular “superficial objectivist approach” 
taken by many international relations scholars, instead advocating for the 
constructivist assertion that the inter-subjective realities created through foreign 
relations, diplomacy, and conflict shape the way in which states perceive of one 
another – and can shed light on the nuanced and seemingly irrational outcomes of 
international relations. The essence of the ideational underpinnings of the current 
Iranian regime’s animosity towards the west is thought to have stemmed not from 
strategic or self-interested considerations, but instead from a “counter-discourse” 
that rebukes and contradicts the ousted Shah’s core social and political values. 
Because the ideology of the Islamic Revolution was formed in direct opposition to 
the previous regime’s emphasis on secularism, modernism, and nationalism, values 
that are similar to if not parallel with those touted by the western world, Iran’s 
current ideological orientation irreconcilably renounces the essence of modern 
western culture. In juxtaposing Iran’s ideological resistance and enmity to western 
values, it seems likely that such a mismatch of ideals contributes to the impediment 
of productive and amicable foreign relations and diplomacy. 
 Drawing from Alexander Wendt’s seminal work, Social Theory of 
International Politics, Maysam Behravesh (2011) stresses the importance of identity, 
normative values and especially historical factors in shaping the current animosity 
between the United States and Iran. Constructivist theory does not reject realist 
focus on power and the structural relevance of the international state system 
outright, but emphasizes that a holistic analysis must take into account the impact of 
ideology and social relations on state interactions. Assuming a realist perspective, 
he suggests, leads to misunderstandings and the development of false assumptions, 
which serve to impede communication and conflict resolution. Approaching state 
behavior as a singular, unified entity ignores the multitude of varying opinions 
present within both the ruling regime and the populace at large. Finally, overlooking 
the significant ramifications that historical conflicts have upon the psyche of a 
nation’s populace and the ways in which national identity is created and 
perpetuated serves as a barrier to understanding the forces that affect the potential 
outcome of inter-state interactions. The scars created by Iran’s perceived 
victimization by western forces and by the U.S.’s residual resentment after the 444 
day Iran hostage crisis have contributed to the animosity still preventing 
reconciliation. 
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 Homeira Moshirzadeh (2007) takes the position that a realist-centric 
understanding of Iran’s behavior in relation it to its nuclear policy cannot effectively 
account for its past and present decisions. Instead, she argues that domestic 
discourses stemming from Iran’s history account for its seemingly erratic and 
uncooperative behavior. The author identifies two-meta discourses in which Iran’s 
subjective values and norms can be grouped: the discourse of (hyper) independence 
and the discourse of justice. The discourse of independence highlights Iran’s past 
regional might, historical victimization, and detrimental relationship with both 
colonial and imperialist forces. Such discursive framing focuses primarily on Iran’s 
perceived need for independence and autonomy. If Iranian leaders are perceived as 
ceding any power to international entities, they are viewed by society as once again 
shamefully capitulating to foreign demands.  
Additionally, the discourse of justice focuses on the double standards held by 
the international community with respect to non-proliferation and leads to the 
rejection of western demands for the cessation of enrichment activities. As a 
signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the additional protocol, the agreement 
permits the enrichment of nuclear material for peaceful purposes. Iran believes that 
all parties should be held equally accountable and views the permissive attitude 
towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel, India, and Pakistan as unfair. 
This inequitable treatment is then framed through public discourse as yet another 
example of the west attempting to undermine Iran’s progress. Within the hyper-
independence discourse is the discourse of resistance, which the ‘new elite’ has 
reinvigorated as a means to renew sentiments associated with the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution, rallying the public under a unified ideology and preserving Iran’s 
concept of rightful autonomy. The western demands for the cessation of enrichment 
activities are seen as overt attempts to retard or erode Iranian independence, and 
thus are vehemently resisted. Any form of compromise perceived as a sign of 
significant weakness in Iran’s leadership. 
 Evoking Ayatollah Khamenei’s 2004 fatwa in which he declared the use of 
nuclear weapons as “immoral” and “forbidden” under Sharia, Nina Tannenwald 
(2012) asserts the West should reinforce Iran’s own proclamation as a means to 
constrain its leaders into adhering to their commitments. In framing Iran’s 
concessions as in compliance with the fatwa and as beneficial to global stability and 
non-proliferation, its leaders could cooperate with international requests without 
losing legitimacy in the public and political sphere. Through what Tannenwald 
describes as political entrapment, strengthening the norms put forth by the Iranian 
leadership would make the violation of such promises more ‘costly’ in terms of 
political legitimacy. A policy of using ideas and discourse to threaten the regime’s 
legitimacy and coerce strict adherence to the NPT stands in stark contrast to the 
realist-oriented policy of threatening sanctions and military action. The 
constructivist policy option takes into account the domestic pressures within 
Iranian politics and uses the reinforcement of subjective Iranian values as a forceful 
diplomatic tool. 
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 Drawing from both constructivist and realist thought, Iran’s foreign policy 
regarding nuclear development can be considered as the product of both security-
seeking and ideological considerations. The international response towards the 
current crisis and the enduring diplomatic impasse between Iran and the rest of the 
global community flow from the complex interactions that have occurred since the 
Islamic Revolution pitted the current Iranian regime against the western world. In 
order to properly understand the variables that have culminated in the runaway 
escalation of tensions, we must explore the historical basis for the inter-subjective 
disjunction between the Iranian Republic and the United States. In the following 
sections, Iran’s nuclear aspirations shown to be linked with its prevailing national 
myth, while the reason for its seemingly irrational defiance of international 
pressures will be explained by focusing on the domestic struggles and 
disagreements present in its political structure. Finally, the U.S. response to Iran 
under both George W. Bush and President Barack Obama will be examined, focusing 
on the power struggle between those actors who promote military intervention as 
the next necessary step to resolve the impasse between Iran and the west and those 
who believe that diplomacy remains the best solution for all involved parties. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Aspirations 
A Brief History Of Iran’s Nuclear Program 
 The instinctive view that contemporary attitudes towards Iran’s nuclear 
development have been consistent demonstrates the historical shortsightedness of 
both the general public and policymakers alike. After the 1953 United States-backed 
coup d’état toppled Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and reinstated 
the western-allied Mohammed Reza Pahlavi as the Iranian monarch, nations such as 
the U.S., U.K., France, and Germany agreed with Iran’s wish to develop nuclear 
technology and granted assistance in terms of technical expertise and physical 
infrastructure (Lotfian 2008). Ironically, these nations laid the foundation for Iran’s 
modern nuclear program in helping to build the Tehran Research Reactor in 1967, 
prompting the Iranian government to ratify the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1970. 
 There was a dramatic reversal of the west’s permissive attitude towards 
Iran’s nuclear program in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Iran was 
immediately isolated, the west withdrew financial and technical support, and halted 
the construction of the partially completed Bushehr nuclear reactor. Uranium 
enrichment and associated research was at a standstill until the mid-1990’s when 
Russia signed an $800M deal to develop the still unfinished reactor (Bowen & Kidd 
2004: 261). However, the fall of the Soviet Union in 1999 served to further ostracize 
Iran from the rest of the international community and fed its deeply ingrained 
paranoia of western powers as the United States emerged as the unilateral world 
hegemon after the culmination of the Cold War (Bahgat 2006: 129). 
 Serious debate over the legitimacy of Iran’s claims that it only sought nuclear 
technology for civilian purposes began in 2002, when an exiled political party 
opposed to the regime, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, exposed an 
undisclosed uranium enrichment facility in Natanz that had been hidden from IAEA 
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inspectors (CRS 2007). Though Iran allowed inspectors to survey the site and 
ratified the Additional Protocol to the NPT in 2003, this did little to allay suspicions 
of foul play. Then U.S. President George Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice further exacerbated the tensions with inflammatory public statements, labeling 
Iran as part of the ‘Axis-of-Evil’ and igniting rabid anti-US sentiments in an already 
anti-west nation (Jones 2010). With concerns growing, Western European powers 
called for Iran to increase transparency and suspend enrichment activities pending 
further review by the IEAE. The Iranian leadership, under reformist President 
Mohammad Khatami decided to suspend enrichment in 2004 while the IEAE 
assessed the situation. 
 However, in 2006, under pressure from U.S. diplomats, the IAEA, led by 
former Director General Mohammed El Baradei, voted to refer Iran to the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) for failing to meet its requirements under the 
Additional Protocol of the NPT: 
“While the Agency is able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in 
Iran, the Agency will remain unable to make further progress in its efforts to verify the absence 
of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless Iran addresses the long 
outstanding verification issues, including through the implementation of the Additional 
Protocol, and provides the necessary transparency.” (GOV/2006/64) 
This referral acted as the impetus for many rounds rounds of increasingly stringent 
sanctions aimed at coercing Iran into suspending its enrichment activities until 
international confidence was regained and IAEA inspectors were provided with 
increased transparency.  
Since the initial IAEA report and the subsequent UNSC Resolution 1695, 
relations between Iran and the U.S. have only deteriorated, as the ‘dual track’ use of 
both sanctions and diplomatic outreach have failed to trigger any change in Iranian 
domestic policy. Very little evidence has emerged that legitimately predicts a 
specific timeline in Iran’s nuclear progression, contrary to numerous ‘red lines’ 
drawn by Israeli officials since 1982 stating that Iran is just been years away from 
acquiring nuclear weapons. For example, in 2004 Israeli intelligence again 
anticipated Iran’s nuclear readiness by 2005 (International Crisis Group 2012). 
Trying to surmise the exact point after which Iran’s alleged nuclear weaponization 
advances past the so-called point of no return has not only led to more aggressive 
rhetorical vilification of Iran and its intentions, but also neglects a necessary 
analysis of the internal pressures within the Islamic Republic that are integral 
formulating well-informed and optimally beneficial policy approaches. 
The Making of Iran’s National Myth 
Iran’s national identity – the way in which it perceives itself and the outside 
world – provides key insights into its nuclear policy and explains the multiple 
discourses that comprise the subjective Iranian reality. While the pursuit of nuclear 
capabilities represents a relatively recent development in the course of Iran’s 
domestic policy, the earliest formative elements of its ideational conception harken 
back to the nation’s fall from a place of regional domination and subsequent 
marginalization. A clear understanding of Iran’s current foreign policy must 
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incorporate the historical underpinnings of its revolutionary ideology and the 
process by which the inter-subjective meaning between itself and the western world 
originates. 
Pre-Revolutionary Historical Factors 
The most basic elements of Moshirzadeh’s (2007) ‘discourse of justice’ stem 
from the idealized recollection of both the glorified Persian Empire and the 
expansive power enjoyed during the Safavid era in the post-Islamic invasion period. 
The significance of this retrospective conception of Iran’s past glory is critical to the 
exploration of the societal and political ideational structures born from Islamic 
Revolutionary thought. Iran’s past history of glory is coupled with the Iranian 
narrative of a long history of victimization originating from the period following the 
ascension of the weak and ineffectual Qajar Dynasty in 1794. After the Russians 
defeated the Qajar Empire in two major battles forcing Iran to cede large areas of 
land and access to the Caspian Sea, the nation’s economy and independence 
diminished to the extent that imperial powers gained the ability to access and 
influence Iranian governance (Barzegar 2009).  
The Constitutional Revolution in 1905 led to the fall of the Qajar Empire and 
represented the Iranian response to the visibly weak governing regime. What 
emerged was a semi-authoritarian regime with the Pahlavi Shah’s leading the way 
towards modernization. However, the moderate form of governance was dismantled 
when the democratically elected Prime Minister, Muhammad Mosaddegh, was 
deposed during a coup d’état, backed by both the United States and The United 
Kingdom, codenamed Operation Ajax, as a response to the nationalization of the 
Iranian oil industry. Each of these defeats and incursions on Iran’s sovereignty form 
the Iranian narrative of historical victimization by foreign entities, but it is the 
revolutionary ideology that emerged as a reaction to western imperialism that 
created a reactionary Islamic identity, contributing to the ideological conflict 
between itself and the west (Shafaee 2010).  
The Ideology of the Islamic Revolution 
The new Shah’s model of rule was that of top-down autocratic governance 
that pushed for modern development reflecting the model of the western world. 
Mohammad Reza Shah’s modernization attempts failed to modernize the country at 
large, with the consequences of destroying the traditional Islamic economy – the 
bazaar – and marginalizing the traditional social support systems of the Ulama 
(religious leaders) and the Waqf (religious endowments) upon which much of the 
populace depended for centuries. By nationalizing the waqfs and forcing the Ulama 
to become dependent on the state for operational funds, the Shah sent a message to 
the populace that secular modernization was to take precedence over the traditional 
institutions that previously served as core elements of the Iranian social and 
political identity (Amineh & Eisenstadt 2007).  
Alienated by the Shah’s attempts to mold Iran in the form of its imperialist 
oppressors, the Islamic clergy and the lower classes rallied around the charismatic 
and defiant voice of Ayatollah Khomeini. Because Reza Shah’s semi-progressive 
 15
policies were aligned with western social and political values and beliefs, 
Khomeini’s revolutionary ideology assumed a reactionary stance and decried all 
things associated with western states and society as necessarily un-Islamic. In doing 
so, the Ayatollah formed Iran’s new identity in direct opposition to the west’s 
subjective reality, blaming the impoverished and underdeveloped state of the 
greater Middle East on the failure of western styles of governance and social order 
(Shafee 2010). After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the public that had believed itself 
to be so neglected and ostracized by the Shah’s failed modernization programs 
flocked to this new reformulation of Islam and society as a return to the idealized 
‘true Islamic society.’ 
Khomeini strove to foster the image of a “global conspiracy” of “imperial 
domination,” personally writing historians to urge them to “show how the people 
struggled against tyranny, and the oppression of stagnation and backwardness, and 
put the ideals…in place of Capitalist Islam, and false Islam, [and] in one word, 
American Islam” (Aghaie 2009: 238). He even went so far as to enshrine this general 
attitude of distrust with the western world within the Iranian Constitution, as 
outlined in Article 152: 
“The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the rejection of all 
forms of domination, both the exertion of it and submission to it, the preservation of the 
independence of the country in all respects and its territorial integrity, the defense of the 
rights of all Muslims, non-alignment with respect to the hegemonic superpowers, and the 
maintenance of mutually peaceful relations with all non-belligerent States.” (Constitution of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ch. X, Art. 152) 
Not only did opposition towards the west arise from a reactionary denunciation of 
its social and cultural norms, but was literally institutionalized in the ideological 
structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran since its conception in 1979. Additionally, 
one of the essential goals of the post-revolutionary Iranian state is “the complete 
elimination of imperialism and the prevention of foreign influence” (Constitution, 
Ch. I, Art. 3, no. 5). 
 Thus, the identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran as constructed in the 
aftermath of the Iranian Revolution vehemently opposes western influence in any 
form, conceptualizing European powers and the United States as nefarious enemies 
that actively seek to oppress the Revolution and erode Iran’s newly acquired 
independence and freedom (Behravesh 2011). The constructivist formulation of the 
factors that led to the formation of Iran’s deep seeded aversion to cooperating with 
western demands reveals the obstacles that have thus far excluded the possibility of 
compromise. Yet, if we operate under the assumption that Iran’s leaders are rational 
actors and do not wish to jeopardize the regime’s existence, it becomes clear that 
domestic political factors must play a part in the nation’s refusal to budge on its 
nuclear policy. The following section addresses the interactions between Iran’s 
socially constructed national identity and the realist considerations, which in turn 
hinder the regime’s ability to act in accordance to what the rest of the international 
community perceives to be its best interests. 
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Motivations, Intentions & Domestic Struggles 
 Contrary to the alarmist formulation of Iran as an irrational soon-to-be 
member of the nuclear country club and intently committed to weaponization 
regardless of international pressure or its professed wish to only develop nuclear 
capabilities for civilian purposes, there is little to no evidence that Iran actually has 
decided to develop nuclear arms or that they intend to carry out some diabolical 
plot to destroy Israel and southern Europe in the name of Islam. In fact, as opposed 
to the claims of Israeli and American politicians and pundits alike, there a surprising 
lack of evidence supporting any of the projected timelines estimating when Iran will 
have crossed the ‘red line’ and buried their uranium enrichment facilities far enough 
underground to immunize themselves against foreign intervention. Furthermore, 
assuming that Iran plans to use this hypothetical weapon to ascend to a position of 
regional hegemony directly contradicts its past behavior. During its extensive 
history of conflicts with foreign states, the Islamic Republic has continuously been 
on the receiving end of external aggression, never once having initiated an offensive 
attack on its neighbors (Lotfian 2008). 
Motivations & Intentions 
 President Ahmadinejad’s colorful rhetoric tends to convey an Iranian drive 
for nuclear development that is rebellious, belligerent, and hostile towards Israel 
and the west. Yet, others stand behind the assertion that Iran only seeks to increase 
the amount of oil available for export by shifting its energy production from fossil 
fuels to nuclear power. The vast majority of onlookers doubt that Iran would incur 
the multitude of sanctions and international disapproval in order to pursue a 
program that is far more costly – both in terms of economic costs from sanctions 
and political costs from non-compliance – than relying on its vast natural gas 
reserves (Bowen & Kidd 2004: 363). While the true goal of Iran’s nuclear 
development may not explicitly be to decrease dependence on domestic oil, its 
persistent attitude seems to fit nicely into the ideational narrative of independence 
from western pressures. 
The nuclear program has come to be viewed as a symbol of national pride, 
the continued pursuit of which further represent its leaders’ refusal to bow to 
international interference (Moshirzadeh 2007). The majority of the Iranian 
leadership vehemently assert the “inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty [NPT] 
to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
without discrimination” as set forth in Article IV of the NPT (Baghat 2006: 130). The 
Iranian people feels that the denial of the rights accorded to it in the NPT represents 
another example of the U.S. and other western forces refusing to pay due respect, 
something which is in direct conflict with the narrative of past glory embedded in its 
ideological discourse of justice (Ben-Meir 2009).  
In order to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the populace, Iranian leaders 
must publically resist the will of foreign powers else loose popular support. The fear 
of the Iranian political elite is that back stepping at this point could open the door 
for a vote of no confidence and result in increased pressure for regime change 
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(Saikal 2006). The Iranian citizens and religious figures tend to intensely criticize 
leaders who are perceived as relinquishing independence regardless of the potential 
benefits, and glorify those who approach foreign policy with a “non-compromising 
totally independent identity” (Moshirzadeh 2007: 563). In a sense, the regime 
backed itself into a corner where little room for compromise exists and the option to 
reverse or amend Iran’s push for nuclear development remains out of reach. 
However, the Iranian public has demonstrated a measure of disdain for clerical 
dogmas and stubborn leadership as manifested by the protests following the 
disputed 2009 elections (Economist 2012: Bombing Iran). While their attitudes 
towards the methods of the ruling elite rarely translate into populist political 
influence, the divergence of popular opinion from the party line reveals the 
potentiality for the economic and psychological consequences from U.S. sanctions 
and assassination of nuclear scientists to create even deeper rifts between the 
leadership the people. 
The majority of foreign relations scholars view Iran’s aspirations for nuclear 
development from a realist perspective, suggesting that the nation’s past conflicts 
with its regional neighbors and paranoia of western incursions on its independence 
fuel the desire for a workable deterrent against future attacks (Dorraj 2006). The 
majority of analysts oppose the hawkish categorization of Iran as pursuing nuclear 
armament in order to rise to a position of regional hegemony, instead asserting that 
it only seeks to ensure its freedom from foreign intervention and the regime’s 
existential anxieties. The encirclement of Iran by American troops stationed in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and the Gulf states paired with the numerous calls for military 
intervention by many U.S. politicians and policy makers further increase the sense 
that a means of deterrence is necessary to protect the revolution’s survival (Takeyh 
2003). In labeling Iran as part of the villainous ‘axis of evil’, the Bush administration 
reinforced the apprehensions created by those who openly lobby for the regime’s 
dethronement.  
Additionally, Iranian leaders are thought to look towards North Korean 
nuclear deterrence as a model; while the regimes of both Saddam Hussein and 
Muammar Gadhafi relinquished their regimes’ nuclear programs and were 
subsequently overthrown by western forces, North Korea has remained immune to 
foreign impositions (International Crisis Group 2012). It is also well aware that its 
conventional military is no match against U.S. forces and offensive capabilities, and 
distinctly remembers the massive number of casualties (approximately 500,000) 
sustained in its last full-on military confrontation during the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 
(Samuel 2011). 
The combination between the ideological importance that the nuclear 
program has come to represent and the strategic security-seeking calculations of 
developing a nuclear program as a deterrent suggest that Iran’s motivations are not 
so clearly driven by irrational religious-based policy considerations as many in the 
neoconservative camp imply. But approaching Iran’s policy as originating from a 
unitary ideology overlooks the push and pull between the conservatives and 
reformists within its political elite. 
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Domestic Struggles 
Some, like Iranian president Mohammad Khatami and other reform-oriented 
members of the ruling elite, appeared open to cooperation, believing that 
developing better ties with the international community and building goodwill with 
the western world must trump potentially damaging ideological stubbornness 
(Takeyh 2003). However, the rise of the Iranian neoconservatives, led by President 
Ahmadinejad, has signaled the end of the cooperative attitude towards western 
demands, instead reasserting the importance of resisting pressure and the pursuit 
of nuclear development regardless of the consequences. An issue that could have 
been solved easily and avoided the imposition of sanctions was instead transformed 
into a movement representing national pride and sovereignty through 
Ahmadinejad’s aggressive rhetoric. His provocative statements during his speech at 
the UN in 2005 aimed to remind his followers and the Iranian elite that he intended 
to stay true to this political platform of making Iran a stronger nation, both 
domestically and internationally (Saikal 2006: 194). Ahmadinejad’s positions can be 
viewed as a means to gain legitimacy and support from the Iranian theocracy that 
backed his conservative political campaign and helped him retain power in the face 
of a contentious election in 2009 (Barzegar 2009: 22).  
Yet it appears that Ahmadinejad’s attempts to rally increased support are 
floundering, with the Supreme Leader and his supporters gravitating away from his 
political posturing and aggressive rhetoric. Aside from public disagreements over 
the scope and limits of the powers of Iran’s President, the Ayatollah’s recent 
reappointment of pragmatist politician Hashemi Rafsanjani despite Ahmadinejad’s 
vehement opposition indicates overt attempts to marginalize Ahmadinejad from 
mainstream Iranian politics (Salsabili 2012). Though Ahmadinejad’s waning power 
has largely diminished his ability to dictate foreign policy, his contribution to the 
increasingly belligerent inter-subjective perceptual understanding between Iran 
and the U.S. has persisted to the detriment of diplomatic outreach efforts. 
While Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad often find themselves 
disagreeing on domestic policies and allocations of power between the religious and 
political institutions, the Supreme Leader still strongly supports Iran’s resistance to 
western demands as a means to ensure the survival of the current regime. To him 
the political cost of granting concessions in response to western pressure outweigh 
the damaging effects of economic sanctions, towards which the regime has always 
adopted a stance of “defiance, mitigation, aversion, insulation, and a self-serving 
public diplomacy campaign” (Takeyh & Maloney 2011: 1309). Yet, given the 
religious ideological formulation of Iranian politics, culture, and society, the fact that 
Ayatollah Khamenei issued a fatwa publicly denouncing the production and use of 
nuclear weapons as fundamentally against Islamic values and Sharia creates a 
significant obstacle for the more radically conservative policymakers within the 
regime who might otherwise increase the likelihood of conflict by openly pursuing 
weaponization (Lotfian 2008: 54). In fact, Khamenei reiterated his condemnation of 
nuclear weapons on February 22, 2012, further solidifying the regime’s convictions 
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and making a reversal or defiance of his proclamation come at an even greater 
political cost. 
It seems that the urgency and anxiety projected onto the Iranian nuclear 
debate not only serves as little more than speculative posturing, but also 
dramatically increases the risk and likelihood of a severely damaging confrontation 
(Walt 2012). Those within the Israeli leadership that view Iran’s ambitions as a 
grave existential threat that must inevitably be addressed through military 
intervention are luckily beholden to the policy decisions of the United States, 
granted that Israel has the capability to initiate a unilateral conflict that would 
inevitably drag its western allies into a bloody and costly confrontation. 
A holistic understanding of the Iranian nuclear conflict cannot simply focus 
on the factors within the Iranian state; one must also include the policies and 
behaviors of the United States. The inter-subjective identities mutually formed by 
the history of engagement between these two nations provide the foundational 
basis for the continued animosity and resistance to compromise that have thus far 
characterized the Iran-U.S. relationship. The changing U.S. response to Iranian non-
compliance and the attitudes of various actors within the U.S. government both form 
America’s self-conception in terms of its own security interests and its subjective 
perception of the Islamic republic of Iran. We see that Iranian identity and behaviors 
are inextricably linked to those of the U.S., with the co-constitution of beliefs 
representing an ongoing process facilitated by repeated interactions on the 
international stage. 
The Response of the United States 
 America’s response to Iran’s nuclear aspirations has remained remarkably 
consistent ever since the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty and rise of Khomeini’s Islamic 
Republic of Iran. As Takeyh and Maloney (2011) note, the U.S. has pursued the same 
‘dual track’ strategy – the application of economic pressure accompanied by 
diplomatic outreach and negotiations – since the initial conflict resulting from the 
1979 American hostage crisis, during which Iranian revolutionaries held the 
American embassy for 444 days before releasing the hostages back into U.S. custody. 
Aside from minor strategic changes, the administrations of President Carter, 
President Regan, President Bush senior, President Clinton, and President George W. 
Bush have adopted nearly identical foreign policies towards Iran. Yet, Iran’s resolve 
has proved unyielding regardless of which U.S. President resides in the oval office. 
Attitudes of the Presidency 
Under the leadership of President George W. Bush, the United States 
assumed its confrontational posture towards the Iran, blatantly calling for regime 
change and ramping up efforts to secure additional sanctions by way of the United 
Nations Security Council. The Bush administration, under Israeli pressure, evoked 
some of the more curious aspects of the initial IAEA report and declared that Iran 
was not only pursuing weapons of mass destruction (an eerily similar message that 
was fallaciously used to justify declaring war against Iraq) but also represented a 
dire threat to both Israel and the United States’ security interests (Fayazmanesh 
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2008). At the same time the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) 
ramped up its congressional lobbying efforts in order to incite existential fear of 
Iran as a means to legitimize the application of harsher sanctions and counter the 
shift in America’s approach following the 2004 Paris Agreement.  
 The neoconservative efforts to maintain an alarmist framing of the Iranian 
nuclear issue were aided by the 2005 Iranian Presidential Elections, where the 
radically conservative candidate, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, won over the more 
moderate Rafsanjani. President Ahmadinejad, running his campaign platform on the 
premise of delivering Iran back to its rightful place of glory and to defending its 
sovereignty against the imperialistic western states, gave a controversial speech 
before the United Nations General Assembly in September of 2005. After outlining 
the evils of western hegemony, condemning the evil Zionist state of Israel, and 
pointing to the hypocrisy of NPT signatory nations with nuclear arms, Ahmadinejad 
announced that Iran was to pursue civilian nuclear programs regardless of western 
opinions or edicts (Ahmadinejad 2005). He had provided neoconservatives with 
ample ammunition to further demonize the Iranian nation, becoming the figurehead 
of a nation that allegedly sought to develop nuclear weapons in order to “wipe Israel 
off the map” and confront the U.S. and its allies (Jones 2010: 137). Surprisingly, 
former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice did her best to mitigate the 
warmongering inclinations of former Vice President Dick Cheney, working to 
construct the image of a U.S. that advocated multilateral diplomatic outreach 
towards Iran in reaction to the fallout associated with the Iraqi war. 
Fortunately, President Bush finished his second term without the threat of a 
preemptive strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities coming to fruition. Trita Parsi (2012) 
explains that incoming U.S. President Barack Obama has assumed a relatively fresh 
stance towards dealing with Iran, leaning heavily towards diplomacy as his main 
tool of outreach, and initially opposing the dominant notion that negotiations with 
Iran must be confrontational in nature. While he forwarded the policy that Iran 
should not be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons, he advocated for a strategy of 
engagement that sought to communicate a sentiment of mutual respect. This 
significant shift in tactics demonstrates an unprecedented understanding of Iran’s 
ideational structure and national identity, appealing to their sense of pride and 
lessening the aggressive and hard-liner attitude assumed by previous 
administrations.  
While political pressure has forced President Obama demonstrate solidarity 
with Israeli President of Netanyahu over collective concerns about Iran’s nuclear 
pursuits, castigating the Republican politicians for opening “beating the drums of 
war” in regards to Iran denotes his understanding of detrimental effects such loose 
talk of aggression can have on the future success of diplomatic efforts (Calmes & 
Landler 2012). It appears that President Obama’s strategies have proven more 
effective than those of past administrations, with Ayatollah Khamenei lauding his 
efforts to quell public talks of war and the dire economic consequences stemming 
from his application of pointed and all-encompassing sanctions producing tangible 
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shifts in the Iranian public’s support for Ahmadinejad’s brand of aggressive and 
defiant foreign policy (Economist 2012: “Ever-resilient…”). 
AIPAC and Domestic Political Struggles 
Yet Israeli pressure groups and the more hawkish members of congress 
continually reiterate their fear that Iran cannot be contained once it passes the 
hypothetical “red line” of uranium enrichment, and that such a development 
necessarily spells out disaster for the Israeli state and the inevitable transfer of 
nuclear warheads into the hands of terrorist organizations worldwide. Walt & 
Mearsheimer (2007) view Israeli pressure groups as the primary obstacle to 
improved relations between the U.S. and Iran, as they represent one of the most 
powerful and aggressive lobbying constituencies in Washington. Ensuring peace 
through efforts to normalize U.S.-Iranian relations would serve America’s best 
interests. Yet AIPAC has conflated the security issues of Israel with those of the U.S. 
in order to construct a fearful conception of the Iranian regime as an urgent threat 
that may become immune to intervention at any moment, thus rejecting the 
prolonged process of diplomatic outreach in favor of prompt military action (Oren 
2012: 666). 
The power struggle outlined by Ido Oren (2012) reveals a heated and 
prolonged conflict between various actors in Washington, with the U.S. Congress 
and AIPAC representing the pro-military action position, and the State Department, 
the U.S. intelligence community, and the American defense establishment 
comprising the anti-war/pro-diplomacy advocates. Congress, throughout America’s 
contentious relations with the post-revolutionary Iranian state, has been the main 
political entity calling for war, and the reason behind the majority of economic 
sanctions imposed by the federal government thus far. AIPAC finds U.S. 
representatives and Senators much easier to lobby than the executive branch, and 
accordingly provide a platform upon which politicians compete to have the most 
stern and aggressive attitude towards the Iranian. This competition between 
political parties for the influential support of the AIPAC results in the verbalization 
of arguably the most aggressive and bellicose anti-Iranian statements (Ibid: 667). 
Notably, the neoconservative view that any form of reconciliation with the 
current Iranian regime appears impossibility runs counter to their push for 
increasingly stringent economic pressures, suggesting that their consistent calls to 
impose further sanctions are merely instrumental. The right-leaning U.S. 
administrations, in addition to the more hawkish congressional leaders, seem to use 
such policy initiatives to appeal to their conservative base given that they represent 
assertive and tangible action to oppose Iran’s behavior. Yet the failure of these 
sanctions to result in any legitimate shifts in Iranian policy comes with few political 
costs to these politicians, who can point to their hardline legislative records while 
extolling the benefits of war in the face of unsuccessful economic and diplomatic 
pressures. 
On the other side of the argument, the U.S. State Department has worked to 
reduce political hysteria, with Condoleezza Rice, Hillary Clinton, and other high-
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ranking members consistently advocating for a reconceptualization of Iran as a 
vulnerable, isolated, and relatively weak state the behavior of which does not 
warrant military intervention. Additionally, the U.S. intelligence community strongly 
refutes the notions that Iran is definitely pursuing nuclear weaponization and that 
there is any evidence suggesting it is close to the development of warheads. Two 
National Intelligence Council documents released in 2007 and 2007 indicating a 
moderate level of certainty that Iran is not working to develop nuclear weapons, a 
seemly intentional decision by intelligence leaders given that these documents are 
rarely released to the public. Finally, and perhaps most convincingly, Joint Chief of 
Staff Michael Mullen and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates have both urged 
congress and the administration to avoid a war with Iran at all costs, suggesting that 
the potentially consequences far outweigh potential gains. 
Despite the continual struggles between various entities in Washington 
regarding U.S. policy towards Iran, the hawkish urges of congress and 
neoconservatives has thus far been restrained. With President Obama in office and 
the leaders of the American armed forces opposing military action against Iran’s 
nuclear program, it seems that diplomacy is prevailing over military action for the 
time being. Yet, it is unclear what would come of a unilateral preemptive strike by 
military forces, and if the United States and other European Allies would be dragged 
into another Middle Eastern conflict. Furthermore, it appears that a preemptive 
strike would provide minimum strategic gains, given that the clandestine nature of 
Iran’s nuclear program and the limited intelligence on the exact location and 
number of enrichment facilities precludes the certainty that military action would 
actually hinder nuclear development efforts (Kreps & Fuhrmann 2012). However, 
unless Iran decides to increase the transparency of its nuclear program and strive 
towards building goodwill with the international community, there is no way to 
predict if the near future will be characterized by war, new diplomatic inroads, or 
continued political posturing and ever-tightening economic sanctions. 
Conclusion 
 Despite the best efforts of international organizations, threats of military 
actions, diplomatic outreach, and economic pressure, Iran’s nuclear program, 
specifically whether its enrichment activities are for peaceful purposes or the 
pursuit of nuclear weaponry, remains much of a mystery to the outside world. The 
realist perspective can shed light on the strategic considerations of the Iranian 
regime, painting a picture of a paranoid and isolated nation seeking to ensure its 
independence and security against incursions by foreign entities that have and 
continue to threaten its economic and political interests. It also explains the fears 
and anxieties of neoconservative politicians and pundits who believe that there is an 
imminent threat of Iran developing offensive nuclear capabilities and using such 
capabilities to destroy Israel and restore its previously held position of regional 
hegemony. However, closer analysis of Iran’s past policymaking objectives reveals 
that the regime has and will continue to work towards insuring its survival and that 
of the revolution, which the development or use of nuclear weapons would seriously 
undermine. 
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A constructivist analysis reveals the ideational structures that form Iran’s 
subjective identity and exposes the forces that have hindered efforts to reach 
diplomatic solutions between Iran and the western world. The national identity 
formed by its historical recollection and idealization debunks claims that the Islamic 
Republic must be irrational to continue pursuing its nuclear aspirations despite the 
fact that the economic losses from its continued obstinacy far surpass the marginal 
gains a self-sufficient civilian nuclear power program would bring. International 
pressures, condemnations, and demands have transformed the significance of its 
nuclear program from a means for additional economic development to a symbol of 
national pride, independence, and resistance. Its leaders cannot back down from 
their commitments unless the international community acknowledges the 
ideological pressures that have thus far prevented Iran from cooperating with 
international bodies, and strives to foster a new approach that keeps such 
limitations in mind. 
The renewed emphasis on diplomatic cooperation supported by the Obama 
administration seems to reflect an evolving understanding that military 
intervention is not the answer to the continuing deadlock in negations, given the 
staggering financial and human cost of a conventional war between Iran and the 
United States. Similarly, the marginalization of Ahmadinejad and a measurable shift 
away from his bellicose rhetoric suggest that Iranians are becoming increasingly 
responsive to foreign calls for compromise. Contrary to those who doubt the 
efficaciousness of economic and diplomatic pressures, recent events may suggest a 
shift in Iran’s openness to pursuing a diplomatic compromise (Economist 2012: 
Wink or Blink). U.S. and Iranian politicians alike have made a concerted effort to 
frame the most recent round of diplomatic talks in Istanbul in a positive light and 
emphasized that both sides have appeared more open to compromise than in past 
diplomatic forays (Risen 2012). It also appears that looming financial catastrophe 
associated with the implementation of the most recent round of sanctions, excluding 
Iran from the banking network dubbed the Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) and thus drastically limiting its ability to 
participate in international trade, has acted as an effective incentive for Iranian 
leaders to reassess their attitude of non-cooperation (Gladstone & Castle 2012).  
While diplomacy may be progressing given the recent shifts in strategic 
engagement and changes in domestic politics within both the United States and Iran, 
pursuing policies that are sensitive to the differing ideational structures and 
subjective understandings within these two nations remains of paramount 
importance if this conflict is to be resolved without military force. The United States 
must continue to express its desire for a diplomatic solution, openly rejecting those 
who call for a preemptive strike, resisting the public characterization of the Iranian 
regime as nefarious, and continuously reaching out to both the Iranian people and 
leadership. The west should embrace Iran’s right to generate its own nuclear power 
for peaceful purposes, and approach negotiations with a newfound sense of mutual 
respect that appeals to Iran’s self-conception. Iranian leaders must express a 
willingness to cooperate with western demands and work within the international 
system, weighing its security considerations against its ideational bias towards 
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noncompliance and anti-western rhetoric. Only through compromise and 
cooperation can the security of the Iranian public and the longevity of the current 
regime be safeguarded, as even those opposed to military action as a viable solution 
contend that an Iran possessing nuclear weapons is an unacceptable outcome. 
Realism and constructivism, in the case of the Iranian nuclear conflict, 
complement each other in helping to fuse the conceptualizations of a rational 
Iranian regime with its need for security, independence and recognition from the 
international community with the ideational structures that underlie Iran’s 
subjective values and perception. A new understanding of the conflict emerges, 
where the primary source of contention stems from the mutual animosity formed by 
the repeated interactions between the United States and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. The failure to appreciate a realist-motivated Iranian regime focused primarily 
on self-preservation and the significant role of political posturing and discourse 
within both nations in escalating tensions has only hindered diplomatic efforts to 
the extent that negligible progress has been made in over 30 years despite changing 
leadership and fluctuating global concerns. In order to understand and address the 
ideological conflicts that create the foundational animosity between Iran and the 
west, the same process of fusing realist and constructivist theory must inform 
proposed diplomatic solutions. It is only after both Iran and United States 
understand their fundamental differences and the ideational basis for those 
differences that both parties can design a policy program that attempts to address 
these ideological conflicts as a means to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution to 
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